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INTRODUCTION
Why Has the FCPA Prospered?
Lee C. Buchheit*
Ralph Reisner**
U.S. courts have long struggled with legislation that purports to regu-
late the conduct of persons outside the United States. In 1909, when the
world seemed a simpler place, Justice Holmes articulated a strictly territo-
rial approach to the issue:
But the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as law-
ful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the
act is done.... For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the
actor, to treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the place
where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an interference
with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations,
which the other state concerned justly might resent.!
As the century moved on, however, American jurisprudence on this is-
sue became more subtle and expansive. The authority to regulate conduct
occurring within one's territory was never in doubt. What changed over the
years was a growing concept of so-called "effects" jurisdiction; that is, the
authority to regulate conduct occurring outside of one's own territory if that
conduct had a substantial effect within the country.2 Effects jurisdiction
was the philosophic basis for important U.S. legislation in areas such as an-
titrust and the sale of securities that purported to regulate conduct taking
place outside the United States having a direct effect in this country.
Partner, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, New York.
.. Director, Office of Advanced International Legal Studies, and Acting Professor of
Law, Northwestern University School of Law.




International Law & Business 18:263 (1998)
But as Justice Holmes predicted in 1909, every attempt to extend the
reach of U.S. law outside the territory of the United States risks friction
with other countries. The most recent example of such friction was trig-
gered by the passage of a law popularly known as the Helms-Burton Act.3
Among other things, the Helms-Burton Act creates a federal cause of action
in the United States on behalf of any U.S. national who has a claim for
property confiscated by Cuban authorities since January 1, 1959. 4 Such a
claim can be brought by the prior owner against any person who "traffics"
in property previously belonging to the claimant. "Trafficking," in turn, is
defined to include both the purchase and sale of such property as well as
"engaging in a commercial activity" which has the consequence "of using
or otherwise benefiting from the confiscated property."5 Thus, for instance,
a Mexican or Canadian company that purchases a commodity grown on
confiscated property and that, coincidentally, does business in the United
States may be sued in the United States by the prior owner of the confis-
cated property. Additional sanctions against those trafficking in confiscated
property include being barred from entry into the United States. These
sanctions apply to persons who are affiliated by ownership, employment or
family relationship with the persons deemed to have trafficked in confis-
cated property. One of the purposes of Helms-Burton was to discourage
persons and companies from doing business in Cuba 6 and thereby to in-
crease pressure on the Castro regime to liberalize the political system in that
country.
The international reaction to the Helms-Burton Act has been fierce.7
But even while the Helms-Burton debate has been raging, an earlier iece
of U.S. legislation, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA or Act), has
garnered unexpected flattery from some of the same countries that have
been so vigorous in denouncing the Helms-Burton Act. There are two pos-
sible explanations for these different reactions. One explanation is that
other countries view more leniently extraterritorial legislation which ad-
3The Cuban Liberty and Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110
Stat. 785 (codified as 22 U.S.C. § 6021-91 (1996)) [hereinafter Helms-Burton Act].41d. § 301(5) & (6).51d. § 4(13)(A).
6See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Agora: The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Lib-
ertad) Act: Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L LAW 419, 427
(1996) (citing House Comm. on International Relations, Cuban Liberty and Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1995, H.R. Rep. No. 104-202, pt. 1 at 39, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995)).7How to Lose Friends andAnnoy People, ECONOMIST, July 20, 1996, at 16 ("[T]he law's
bite was delayed for six months to appease the Europeans, Canadians, and Mexicans. Pre-
dictably, nobody is pleased.").
8Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, as amended
by Title V of the Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§
5001-03, 102 Stat. 1415, 1415-25 (codified as amended at 15. U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2),
78m(b)(3), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1994)).
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vances a policy that is widely accepted by the international community (in
the case of the FCPA, this policy was the suppression of bribery and cor-
ruption). Under this explanation, at least part of the problem with the
Helms-Burton Act is that it seeks to further a political objective of the
United States (liberalizing the regime in Cuba) under the guise of vindicat-
ing principles of international law relating to the confiscation of property.
An alternative explanation is that other countries object more to the
means by which the extraterritorial legislation seeks to attain its objectives
than they do to the nature of those objectives as such. The FCPA is, after
all, far more restrained in imposing itself on foreigners than is the Helms-
Burton Act. The FCPA is not a law that attempts to punish foreigners for
bribery committed abroad, nor is it a law that subjects the U.S.-based prop-
erty of a foreigner to seizure or private litigation risk as a result of a bribe
paid outside the United States.
The anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA apply only to U.S. citizens
and corporations (referred to in the Act as "domestic concerns"9), and to
foreign companies whose securities are listed on a U.S. exchange if those
companies use any means of "interstate commerce" in carrying out the
bribery of a foreign official.10 Even foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corpora-
tions were deliberately excluded from the coverage of the anti-bribery pro-
visions of the Act." Foreign individuals are at risk for their conduct outside
the United States only in limited circumstances where they are acting as
agents for a domestic concern.
1 2
Thus, in passing the FCPA, the U.S. Congress sought primarily to dis-
cipline the behavior of U.S. companies in bribing foreign officials. Con-
gress knew that this would in many cases place U.S. companies at a
competitive disadvantage with their foreign counterparts, but Congress did
it anyway in pursuit of the higher goal of promoting transparent interna-
tional business practices. It was, of course, something of a gamble. Unless
international norms eventually conformed to the U.S. lead on this issue,
U.S. companies would have been permanently hamstrung by their own
Congress.
The charm of the FCPA in the eyes of foreigners may therefore lie both
in the fact that its policy objective (suppression of bribery) was widely ac-
cepted by the international community, and in the perception that the means
by which the Act sought to achieve that end were moderate and reasonable.
915 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(10)(B) (1994).
1015 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (1994).
1'See David E. Brodsky, More than an Artifact of the '70s? Foreign Subsidiaries and
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Business Crimes Bulletin: Compliance & Litigation,
Mar. 1995, at 5 ("Congress deliberately excluded [foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies]
from coverage under the FCPA because of the jurisdictional, enforcement, and diplomatic
difficulties inherent in prosecuting foreign entities.").
12See Dooley v. United Technologies Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428, 440 (D.D.C. 1992).
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Whatever the reason, the FCPA has been instrumental in bringing the issue
of corruption to the forefront of many international agendas. 13
On December 17, 1997, for example, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) signed a convention to combat the
bribery of "foreign public agents" in the pursuit of business. 14 International
financial institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and regional devel-
opment banks have also over the past year moved vigorously to implement
policies designed to curb corruption in the programs, and in the countries,
funded by these institutions.15
These international initiatives against corruption were largely inspired
by the policies embedded in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The articles
in this symposium trace this evolution from the domestic origins of the
FCPA to the very recent multilateral efforts to suppress corruption in inter-
national business.
The opening article, The Worldwide Banning of Schmiergeld: A Look
at the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on its 20th Birthday, by Judge Stanley
Sporkin provides an illuminating perspective on the origins of the FCPA
and the role of the SEC staff in assisting at its birth.16 Judge Sporkin's arti-
cle also shows how a deceptively simple regulatory device - the require-
ment that corporations keep accurate books and records - has had a
dramatic effect on curbing questionable business practices by U.S. compa-
nies.
17
The FCPA has been remarkably effective in altering corporate behav-
ior. Many large multinational corporations have instituted "compliance pro-
grams" designed to deter and uncover activities that could, at the least,
embarrass the company and, and at the worst, subject it to civil or criminal
penalties. The elements of an effective compliance program are the subject
of Daniel Goelzer's article, Designing an FCPA Compliance Program:
Minimizing the Risks of Improper Foreign Payments.18
If a violation of the FCPA does occur, the corporate defendant will
need to make a number of crucial tactical decisions, some of which are
unique to the defense of an action under the FCPA. For instance, strategies
13Martin Wolf, Corruption in the Spotlight, FN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1997, at 23.
"Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Busi-
ness Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998); see also Robert Graham, Anti-bribes convention signed, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 1997, at 6.
15 Stephanie. Flanders, Clear thinking on corruption, FIN. TIMEs (London), June 23,
1997, at 10; Guy de Jonquieres & John Mason, Goodbye to Mr. 10%, FIN. TIMEs (London),
July 22, 1997.
16 See Stanley Sporkin, The Worldwide Banning of Schmiergeld: A Look at the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act on its Twentieth Birthday, 18 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 269 (1998).
17 See Id.
"s See Daniel Goelzer, Designing an FCPA Compliance Program: Minimizing the Risks
oflmproper Foreign Payments, 18 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 282 (1998).
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that may be appropriate in defending against civil charges brought by the
Securities and Exchange Commission may be quite different from, and
sometimes in conflict with, those required to respond to criminal changes
brought by the Department of Justice. The need to reconcile conflicting
strategies may also arise where management is confronted with having to
balance the tactical advantages of conducting an internal investigation (fol-
lowed by self-reporting) against the criminal liabilities that may flow from
any disclosures. A comprehensive analysis of these and other key issues
related to the defense of actions brought against corporate defendants under
the FCPA is the subject of Arthur Mathews' seminal article, Defending SEC
and DOJ FPCA Investigations and Conducting Related Corporate Internal
Investigations: The Triton Energy/Indonesia SEC Consent Decree Settle-
ments.
The FCPA has not only changed the way U.S. corporations do business
overseas, it has also established a model that is being emulated by the inter-
national community. This evolution from a domestic U.S. law, enacted
unilaterally, to multinational initiatives such as those recently adopted by
the OECD, the European Union and the Organization of American States is
the subject of David Gantz's article, Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign
Bribery: The Emergence of a New International Legal Consensus.2 °
This symposium also includes a "Perspectives" section consisting of
three commentaries that deal with selected issues concerning national and
international efforts to stem corruption in emerging market economies. The
first of these, International Financial Institutions Face the Corruption
Eruption: If the IFIs Put Their Money Where Their Mouth Is, the Corrup-
tion Eruption May Be Capped, by James Wesberry, Jr., provides a candid
and revealing account of the internal processes within the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund that have, after many years, led those in-
stitutions to adopt policies designed to stem corruption in recipient coun-
tries.2 '
The second commentary, The Problem of Corruption: A Tale of Two
Countries, by Kimberly Ann Elliott, focuses primarily on the policies that
can be undertaken by local authorities in emerging market economies to
curb corruption.22
19 See Arthur Mathews, Defending SEC and DOJ FCPA Investigations and Conducting
Related Corporate Internal Investigations: The Triton Energy/Indonesia SEC Consent De-
cree Settlements, 18 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 303 (1998).
20 See David Gantz, Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery: The Emergence of a
New InternationalLegal Consensus, 18 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 457 (1998).
21 See James Wesberry, Jr., International Financial Institutions Face the Corruption
Eruption: If IFIs Put Their Money Where Their Mouth Is, the Corruption Eruption May Be
Capped, 18 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 498 (1998).
22 See Kimberly Ann Elliott, The Problem of Corruption: A Tale of Two Countries, 18
Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 524 (1998).
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The efforts by one major U.S. multinational company to fashion an ef-
fective FCPA compliance program is the subject of the concluding com-
mentary, The Development of Compliance Programs: One Company's
Experience, by Patrick Head, former General Counsel of the FMC Corpo-
ration.2
3
In closing, it is with regret and great sorrow that we must inform the
readers of the untimely passing of Arthur Mathews, who authored the arti-
cle around which this symposium was organized. Mr. Mathews, who
passed away on May 24, 1998 at the age of 60, was a senior partner at
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering and in that capacity earned a reputation as one
of the leading white collar criminal defense lawyers in the country. He also
made his mark as a teacher and scholar having taught on various occasions
at the law schools of Georgetown, George Washington and American Uni-
versity. His scholarly interests also led him to be a fi'equent contributor to
professional journals. Mr. Mathew's major published work is the three-
volume treatise entitled Civil RICO Litigation. As his contribution to this
symposium makes clear, Mr. Matthews had the capacity to take extraordi-
narily complex subjects and make them comprehensible to the non-expert.
It is unlikely that this symposium would have come to pass without his ad-
vice, counsel and outstanding contribution.
23 See Patrick Head, The Development of Compliance Programs: One Company's Expe-
rience, 18 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 535 (1998).
